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Numerous studies have shown that processing and retail industries have actively engaged in 
assisting farmers to join the modern food marketing systems. Data from the Polish dairy sector 
shows that assistance is provided not only for the traditional-channel farmers wishing to modernise, 
but also for farmers already included in the modern marketing channel. Drawing on the literature 
two explanations could be provided to account for this phenomenon: 1) even the modern-channel 
farmers lack sufficient funds to maintain required quality/quantity on their own; 2) after 
undertaking the necessary adjustments the modern-channel farmers are more likely to quit their 
relationship with current processor and turn elsewhere so the assistance is needed to prevent them 
from doing that. Basing on the household data, it is robustly found that these hypotheses could 
provide at most partial explanation for vertical linkages observed between modern-channel 
processors and farms. The present paper takes advantage of logit models, instrumental variables’ 
approach, panel data estimations as well as propensity score matching methods. 
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During the last two decades the process of ongoing globalisation has been profoundly 
reshaping the food marketing system. For that reason the issue of food supply chain 
restructuring has recently become a subject of great interest in the agricultural 
economics literature. Several important features of this phenomenon have been 
distinguished. Numerous contributions have stressed the need to recognise the 
vertically-linked nature of the food marketing system (see, for instance, Sexton and 
Lavoie, 2001; Hobbs and Young, 2001; or McCorriston, 2002, among others). Other 
authors have noted increasing consolidation of food processing and retailing sectors 
(Cotterill, 1999; Sheldon and Sperling, 2003). Moreover, a lot of attention has been 
devoted to the issue of strict food safety and quality standards recently being 
introduced by private sectors downstream from agriculture.  
The above strand of the literature has mainly concentrated on the impact that supply 
chain transformation may have on small farmers’ market participation. In summary, 
the investigated relationship adds to places where researchers have not reached a 
general consensus. What seems to be beyond dispute, though, is that, overall, 
inclusion in the modern marketing channel, i.e. the one governed by private quality 
standards, has been beneficial to farmers, regardless of their size. The present paper is 
an attempt to investigate this issue into more detail. More specifically, it takes closer 
look at the nature of vertical coordination occurring in dairy sector in Poland. During 
the past decade dairy industry has undertaken wide range of activities to encourage 
farmers to modernise. Recent survey showed that processors' assistance is provided 
not only to farmers wishing to adjust to new market conditions, but also to farmers 
already included in the modern marketing channel. Using quantitative data, the 
present paper attempts to contrast this finding with theoretical predictions provided in 
the current literature. In particular, two hypotheses for the emergence of vertical 
coordination are tested empirically. One of them assumes that vertical linkages stem 
from farmers' insufficient access to financial capital. The other perceives the issue of 
vertical relationships from the angle of farmer loyalty towards purchasers. Conducted 
regressions robustly indicate that neither of the two hypotheses may solely account for 
the support given to the modern-channel suppliers.  
The paper is organised into five parts. Section 2 provides a brief overview of recent 
contributions to the literature dealing with the issue of vertical coordination in the context of food supply chain modernisation. Basing on the presented theory, it 
generates testable hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and gives some background 
information on the Polish dairy sector’s restructuring. Section 4 collates the 
theoretical predictions with the data using econometric tests. The final part draws out 
the main conclusions.  
 
2. VERTICAL COORDINATION – THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As mentioned earlier, there is a general consensus among researchers that inclusion in 
the modern marketing channel is beneficial to farmers irrespective of their size. Vast 
majority of contributions to the theoretical and empirical literature have attributed this 
outcome to the presence of vertical coordination in the food sector. Even from a 
cursory glance at the data it becomes clear that as modernisation of the food 
marketing system proceeds, transactions are less and less often made as spot market 
exchanges (Frank and Henderson, 1994; Hennessy, 1996). Instead they take a form of 
more or less sophisticated linkages between transacting parties (Henderson, 1994). 
Numerous studies have shown that farmers, faced with the necessity to comply with 
public and private food safety and quality standards, have been often provided by 
downstream food firms with various support measures (see Swinnen, 2006, for an 
overview of recent findings). In this regard, vertical contractual relationships between 
downstream and upstream sectors have become the key to farmers’ participation in 
the evolving food supply chain.  
Two main reasons have been provided in the agricultural economics literature for the 
emergence of vertical coordination in the food supply chain. On the one hand, it has 
been argued that after the implementation of quality standards downstream food 
companies lack sufficient supplies of high quality raw agricultural commodities (see 
e.g. Swinnen, 2007). As a result of that, their processing capacity cannot be fully 
utilised. In response to this, downstream enterprises undertake various activities to 
encourage farmers to upgrade and increase their production. Scope and intensity of 
processors’ assistance depends on the extent of rural markets underdevelopment 
which impedes farmers’ access to production inputs and to external funding in 
particular. In the remainder of the paper this approach to the emergence of vertical 
coordination will be referred to as the insufficient capital hypothesis reflecting that 
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capital endowments.  
An alternative approach to the existence of vertical coordination places the analysis in 
the framework of transaction costs theory (Hobbs, 1996). In this context, the nature 
and intensity of vertical relationships are determined by the level and relative 
importance of costs arising prior, during, and after the transaction is made. From this 
point of view then, vertical coordination is perceived as a tool for establishing long-
term and stable relationships with suppliers so as to minimise transaction costs 
associated with sourcing raw agricultural products (Hobbs, 1996). In this manner, one 
may see it as a tool to generate mutual loyalty between transacting parties.  
In the context of vertical coordination, the issue of farmer (dis)loyalty towards 
downstream companies acquires special significance also when one approaches the 
analysis from the angle of agency theory (Hennessy, 1996; Chalfant et al., 1999) 
and/or contract theory (Salanié, 1997; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). As noted 
earlier, adjustment processes at the farm level are often financially supported by 
downstream food enterprises. It is important to notice that, once engaged in assisting 
farmers to adjust, downstream companies may have incentives to continue to offer 
similar services also in the future. First, by doing so they reduce the risk of facing the 
moral hazard problem manifesting itself in farmers misusing the funds intended for 
given investments. Second, while engaging in closer co-operation with farmers, 
downstream food firms reduce the risk of losing their already modernised suppliers to 
competitors who either have larger financial resources or are less engaged in 
supporting changes at the farm level. In this regard, vertical coordination 
counterbalances potential advantage of competitors being able to offer farmers higher 
monetary bonuses. Therefore, close vertical linkages between downstream and 
upstream sectors may be seen as a tool to create new (dis)incentives to both 
transacting parties so as to generate mutual loyalty. Strengthening contract 
enforcement with the use of so-called private enforcement capital can be quoted here 
as an example (Gow and Swinnen, 2001). In the rest of the paper this approach to 
emergence of vertical coordination will be referred to as the loyalty hypothesis stating 
that vertical linkages are predominantly meant to prevent farmers from shifting to 
other purchasers.  
  3 3 3The above discussion presented motivations for vertical coordination to arise.  Section 
below tries to confront these considerations with empirical evidences from dairy 
sector in Poland. Focus is placed predominantly on testing whether the ‘loyalty’ and 
‘insufficient capital’ hypotheses defined above could account for the support offered 
by the dairy companies to the modern-channel farmers, that is those already included 
in the restructured marketing system.  
 
3. DATA & BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
The picture presented below draws on qualitative data from 13 dairies as well as 
information collected from 185 dairy family farms from two regions located in north-
eastern part of Poland, namely Podlaskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie.
1 The survey 
was conducted in 2007 and covered, among others, information on households’ 
characteristics and farm linkages with dairy processors. In order to gain better insights 
into the nature and evolution of vertical coordination the questionnaire included 
number of retrospective questions referring to the year 2001.  
One of the most profound features of the dairy supply chain restructuring has been the 
evolution of the modern marketing channel through which milk goes from farm to 
dairy. Traditionally milk sales have been organised with the intermediary of collection 
points. Milk has been delivered there by farmers and later on collected by the dairy. In 
the modern marketing channel, on the other hand, milk is directly purchased at the 
farm by a dairy truck.  
Accordingly, it is useful to distinguish between two types of processing enterprises 
and farmers. On the one hand, there are dairy companies that source milk only 
through the modern marketing channel, hereafter referred to as the modern-channel 
processors. On the other hand, there are companies which combine milk supplies 
from both the modern and the traditional marketing channels, hereafter referred to as 
the mixed-channel processors. Analogically, farmers supplying the modern marketing 
                                                 
1 The data was gathered as a part of the research conducted within the Regoverning Markets project 
investigating the impact of agro-food chain restructuring on farmers’ behaviour and practices. More 
about the project can be found at http://www.regoverningmarkets.org/en. For its application to the 
Polish dairy sector and detailed description of the data, see Wilkin et al. (2007) or Milczarek et al. 
(2007).  
  4 4 4channel will be referred to as the modern-channel farmers and those supplying the 
traditional channel will be referred to as the traditional-channel farmers.  
The collected data suggests that vertical coordination has become an inherent part of 
the dairy supply chain landscape. Assistance programmes and/or various incentive 
bonuses were provided by all surveyed processors.
2 What needs to be stressed here 
therefore, is the fact that vertical linkages between downstream enterprises and 
farmers could be observed in case of both the modern- and mixed-channel processors. 
In other words, relying solely on supplies coming from farmers meeting the modern 
channel requirements does not lead to quitting vertical linkages within the food 
marketing system.  
Below an econometric analysis is employed to test whether the two above-mentioned 
hypotheses could account for the assistance provided to the modern-channel farmers. 
As mentioned earlier, the 'loyalty hypothesis' states that this assistance helps dairies to 
prevent already modernised farmers from switching to competitors. Therefore, if this 
hypothesis were to hold, one should observe the modern channel farmers being more 
eager to shift to other purchasers than their traditional counterparts. The 'insufficient 
capital hypothesis', on the other hand, states that assistance is needed to maintain the 
quality/increase the quantity of output. Hence, if this hypothesis were to hold joining 
the modern marketing channel should not lengthen farmers’ odds on being granted a 
bank loan. Following strategy for econometric testing is adopted. First, a logit model 
is employed. Second, instrumental variables models are used. Finally, robustness 
check is done by taking advantage of the 'panel nature' of the data and using 
propensity score matching methods. 
 
4. ECONOMTERIC ANALYSIS 
 
LOGIT MODEL 
Sample used here comprises 105 households that have always remained in the 
traditional marketing channel and 80 households that have joined the modern 
                                                 
2 Three out of the 13 surveyed processors were relying only on the modern channel supplies whereas 
10 of them could be described as the mixed-channel enterprises. In the latter share of the modern-
channel supplies ranged from 57% to 94%.  
  5 5 5marketing channel at some point after 2001. Logit model which serves as a baseline is 
specified as follows: 
(1)   yit = β0 + β1MCit + β2Fit-n + β3Iit-n + β4Rt + ε 
where i and t index household and year respectively. y, depending on the model, is a 
measure of households access to bank loan or a measure of households willingness to 
shift to other purchaser (see further). MC is the main variable of interest and it aims to 
capture the effect of making the switch from the traditional to the modern marketing 
channel. It is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if a household joined the 
modern channel after 2001 and zero otherwise. F includes a set of variables 
representing three attributes of the farm manager (age, experience and education); 
farm size (in terms of both land and cow herd) and the level of assets. I aims to 
capture the effect of (dis)incentives that are likely to affect farmers’ marketing 
channel choice. It includes variables measuring household access to off-farm job 
opportunities and unearned income sources. In addition, it includes a dummy 
indicating households that experienced problems with processors failing to pay on 
time. Finally, R represents a regional dummy to control for local specificities. In order 
to minimise the potential problem of reverse causality, except for the market channel 
choice variable, education and regional dummy all the control variables refer to 2001. 
Detailed definition of the variables is listed in an Annex. β's are parameters to be 
estimated and ε is the residual.  
In the equation (1) the dependent variable is defined in one of three ways. First, in 
order to test the ‘insufficient capital hypothesis’, it is specified as a dummy variable 
equal to one if a household was granted a bank loan after 2001 and equal to zero 
otherwise. Second, to test the ‘loyalty’ hypothesis two models are estimated. In one 
regression the dependent variable is specified as a dummy variable equal to one if a 
farmer would not be willing to shift to other purchaser and equal to zero otherwise. In 
the second regression the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a farmer 
would be willing to switch to other purchaser and equal to zero otherwise. Variables 
capturing farmer’s propensity to switch between processors base on a following 
question: “Provided no additional costs, would you shift to other purchaser facing the 
opportunity of getting 20% higher price but having no guarantee that this price would 
hold in the future?”.  
  6 6 6  7 7 7
All regressions were estimated using appropriate weights to account for the sampling 
design. The logit estimates are reported in Table 1. Given that the R
2 statistics range 
between 0.19 and 0.47, the F-statistics are significant at least at the 5% level and a 
number of the control variables behave as expected, the estimated model performed 
fairly well. Worth noting might be the coefficient on variable representing land 
endowments (columns 1 and 2). The obtained results indicate that, when controlling 
for the market channel choice, farms’ access to bank loans is no longer dependent so 
much on the provision of collateral. As such this result is in line with findings coming 
from Petrick (2004) who analysed the problem of credit rationing in rural Poland and 
concluded that this was the reputation of the borrower, and not the availability of 
collateral, which has had the strongest effect on access to credit.  
As far as the models investigating the issue of farms loyalty are concerned (columns 
3, 4, 5 and 6), they provide evidence that farms are less willing to switch between 
processors when managed by older farmers or having weaker bargaining position (in 
terms of assets). On the other hand, experiencing problems with payment delays 
increases farms’ propensity to look for better offer somewhere else.  
Most importantly, however, the baseline specifications provide a tool to directly 
verify the hypotheses of interest. First, the reported findings do not support the 
‘insufficient capital hypothesis’. The signs on the coefficients of the market channel 
variable in the relevant models (columns 1 and 2) are positive and highly significant. 
This observation inclines towards the statement that, holding other things constant, 
the modern channel farmers have better access to bank credit then their traditional 
counterparts. This, in turn, implies that dairy companies may offload at least part of 
the burden of supporting the modern channel farmers onto banks. In a sense then, 
their role in assisting the modern farmers should either totally finish or substantially 
decrease. In this context, joining the modern marketing channel seems to be a clear 
sign for a bank that a given farmer is dedicated to his business. As a result, the odds 
on him misusing funds are reduced and farms’ creditworthiness is increased. Second, 
the obtained results tend to show that there is no clear difference between the modern Table 1. Logit estimates measuring the impact of market channel choice on farm’s access to credit and farmers’ propensity to shift to other purchaser 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
  LOGIT/credit LOGIT/credit LOGIT/no  switch LOGIT/no  switch LOGIT/switch LOGIT/switch 
          
Marketing channel  1.315***  1.452***  -0.652  -0.805  -0.07  0.141 
 [0.0047]  [0.0078]  [0.43]  [0.31]  [0.94]  [0.85] 
Age -0.026  -0.031  0.071*  0.073*  -0.249  -0.260* 
 [0.35]  [0.32]  [0.065]  [0.066]  [0.11]  [0.075] 
Experience 0.106  0.103  -0.012  -0.011  0.22  0.224 
  [0.12] [0.10]  [0.72]  [0.76]  [0.28] [0.25] 
Education 0.521  0.434  0.371  0.406  -0.335  -0.346 
  [0.23] [0.23]  [0.21]  [0.17]  [0.69] [0.69] 
Assets typical   -0.294  -0.311  -0.258  -0.246  1.134  1.139 
  [0.27] [0.26]  [0.12]  [0.11]  [0.16] [0.15] 
Machinery 2001  -0.162*  -0.137**  -0.151*  -0.163*  -0.058  0.011 
 [0.058]  [0.033]  [0.071]  [0.053]  [0.57]  [0.93] 
Bank Credit before 2001  1.096    -0.677    0.509   
  [0.32]   [0.34]    [0.71]  
Dairy credit before 2001  -1.121           
 [0.39]           
Land owned 2001  -0.034  -0.026  -0.007  -0.011  0.026  0.029 
  [0.34] [0.39]  [0.70]  [0.56]  [0.59] [0.57] 
Land leased 2001  0.053  0.052*  0.054  0.054  -0.247***  -0.236*** 
 [0.12]  [0.099]  [0.23]  [0.20]  [0.0027]  [0.0074] 
Herd size 2001  0.086  0.104  0.155  0.141  -0.223***  -0.226*** 
 [0.40]  [0.41]  [0.13]  [0.16]  [0.0088]  [0.0092] 
Milk yields 2001  0  0  0  0  -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.18] [0.98]  [0.53]  [0.37]  [0.25] [0.12] 
Labour endowments 2001  0.384*  0.294  0.184  0.233  0.005  -0.05 
 [0.053]  [0.17]  [0.38]  [0.22]  [0.99]  [0.82] 
Off-farm job 2001  0.812  0.856  0.955  0.871  -1.193  -1.168 
  [0.39] [0.38]  [0.17]  [0.19]  [0.19] [0.21] 
Unearned income 2001  -0.884**  -0.996**  -0.351  -0.299  -0.105  -0.094 
 [0.025]  [0.039]  [0.41]  [0.43]  [0.81]  [0.75] 
Delays in payments 2001  -0.299  -0.261  -1.650**  -1.600**  4.467**  4.311** 
 [0.61]  [0.64]  [0.037]  [0.044]  [0.011]  [0.013] 
Podlaskie  0.499 0.481  -0.443  -0.433  1.836 1.857 
  [0.41] [0.38]  [0.67]  [0.67]  [0.25] [0.22] 
Constant -3.224***  -2.177  -3.017**  -3.500**  3.088  3.495 
 [0.0087]  [0.16]  [0.038]  [0.025]  [0.26]  [0.14] 
           
Observations  185 185  182  185  182 185 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.263 0.246  0.196  0.19  0.477 0.472 
p-values in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1and traditional channel farmers in terms of their propensity to switch between 
processors. Therefore, no support for the ‘loyalty hypothesis’ is found either. The 
coefficients on variable representing market channel choice are not significant in none 
of the models 3, 4, 5 and 6. As a consequence, the baseline analysis provides no 
evidence that the modern-channel farmers may be more eager to quit the relationship 
with their current processors than the traditional channel farmers.  
 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES  
The baseline model, although giving a direct insight into relationship between market 
channel choice and farmers’ access to bank credit/propensity to switch processors, is 
likely to suffer from the problems of reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity 
(Angrist and Krueger, 2001). For instance, though it could be hypothesised that 
belonging to the modern marketing channel should facilitate access to bank loans 
(through the positive impact on farm’s creditworthiness) it would be difficult to refute 
the view that access to external funding stimulates farmers to modernise, and 
consequently to leave the traditional channel. Further, it could be argued that farmers’ 
decision to join the modern marketing channel is determined by some unobserved 
factors which are also likely to affect the odds on them getting the bank loan (their 
attitude to risk may be quoted here as an example). Similar concerns could be 
expressed with respect to the relationship between market channel choice and farmer 
loyalty. In order to account for these problems and to get more consistent insights on 
the ‘insufficient capital’ and ‘loyalty’ hypotheses, two-stage least squares 
instrumental variables estimator (2SLS) is applied.
3 The model to be estimated is 
specified as follows: 
(2) MCit = β0 + β1Fit-n + β2Iit-n + β3Rt + β4IVt + ε 
(3) yit = γ0 + γ1MC'it + γ2Fit-n + γ3Iit-n + γ4Rt + μ 
where all the variables are defined as before and IV stands for instruments used to 
cope with the potential endogeneity problem. MC' denotes fitted values obtained from 
estimating equation (2).  
                                                 
3 When deciding for the 2SLS method, instead of using probit or logit to generate first-stage predicted 
values, an approach of Angrist and Krueger (2001) was followed. As argued by the authors, 2SLS 
produces consistent second-stage estimates even with a dummy endogenous variable. Moreover, 2SLS 
yields robust estimates even if the underlying second-stage relationship is non-linear. The same cannot 
be said about non-linear estimates unless non-linear model happens to be exactly right.     10 1 1
Two instruments included in the 2SLS model to control for the unobserved factors are 
distance from the farm to the closest dairy company and distance from the farm to the 
closest collection point. Both of them are believed to affect farmer’s market channel 
choice but have no direct effect on dependent variables in the estimated models, i.e. 
access to credit and willingness to switch between processors. The logic to use 
‘distance variables’ is as follows: the closer the farm to the dairy company (collection 
point) the lower are the transport costs which need to be incurred when supplying the 
modern (traditional) channel. Therefore, the more eager the farmer should be to join 
(remain in) the modern (traditional) channel.
4  
To test for the validity of instruments two methods were applied. First, both of the 
instrumental variables in the first stage regression have statistically significant effects 
on the endogenous variable. Second, they pass the Wooldridge’s score test of 
overidentifying restrictions (Wooldridge, 1995).
5 
The obtained results are reported in Table 2. The findings of the instrumental 
variables models are fully consistent with the results coming from the baseline 
analysis. The estimated coefficients have the same sign and level of significance. 
Overall then, the conducted analysis provides strong evidence that changing from the  
traditional marketing channel to the modern one facilitates access to bank credit. On 
the other hand, no evidence was found that the modern channel farmers are more 
eager to switch between processors than their traditional channel counterparts.  
Two additional approaches were used in order to check the robustness of the 
abovementioned analyses. The first took advantage of the ‘panel’ nature of the data 
and fit the fixed- and random-effect (FE/RE) models whereas the second based on 
propensity score matching methods. Since there is no retrospective data on farmers' 
propensity to switch the former model applies only to testing the 'insufficient capital' 
hypothesis. 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that both instruments measure the distance between the farm and the closest 
dairy/collection point and not the dairy/collection point farmer is delivering milk to. An alternative 
specification with instrument represented by the share of surveyed farmers from the same district 
having cooling tank in 2001 (being indispensable for modern marketing channel) was also estimated 
(not shown). Using this instrument instead of ‘distance’ variables did not affect the main results.  
5 Where the dependent variable was a dummy representing willingness to switch, limited information 
maximum likelihood and generalised method of moments estimators performed better than two-stage 
least square estimator (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). Using different estimator, though, had no 
significant impact on the obtained results and for the reasons of brevity only 2SLS estimates are 
reported. Moreover, for the robustness check, all specifications were re-estimated using only one 
instrument (either distance to dairy or distance to collection point) leaving, however, the main results 
unchanged.  Table 2. Instrumental variables model measuring the impact of market channel choice on farm’s access to credit and propensity to shift to other purchaser 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
  2sls/credit 2sls/credit 2sls/no  switch 2sls/no  switch 2sls/switch 2sls/switch 
           
Marketing channel  0.576***  0.555**  -0.221  -0.184  -0.222  -0.275 
  [0.0074] [0.011]  [0.52]  [0.63]  [0.23]  [0.17] 
Age  -0.002 -0.003  0.013**  0.013** -0.008**  -0.009** 
  [0.61] [0.51]  [0.037]  [0.046]  [0.013]  [0.016] 
Experience 0.015*  0.015*  -0.002  -0.002  0.005  0.004 
  [0.073] [0.065]  [0.66]  [0.73]  [0.37]  [0.34] 
Education 0.115*  0.104  0.058  0.072  -0.028  -0.046 
  [0.087]  [0.10] [0.45]  [0.40] [0.68]  [0.49] 
Assets typical to dairy 2001  -0.048  -0.05  -0.047**  -0.045**  0.054  0.051 
  [0.19]  [0.20] [0.035]  [0.039] [0.26]  [0.27] 
Machinery  2001  -0.017  -0.017*  -0.031*  -0.031** 0.002 0.002 
  [0.10] [0.087]  [0.061]  [0.050]  [0.89]  [0.86] 
Bank credit before 2001  0.097    -0.104   0.131**   
  [0.67]   [0.48]    [0.047]  
Dairy credit before 2001  -0.143    0.325*    -0.157   
  [0.35]   [0.078]    [0.24]  
Land owned 2001  -0.006  -0.005  -0.001  -0.002  0.002  0.003* 
  [0.35]  [0.41] [0.71]  [0.61] [0.19]  [0.093] 
Land leased 2001  0.007  0.007  0.009*  0.009*  -0.005  -0.005 
  [0.20]  [0.13] [0.078]  [0.054] [0.19]  [0.23] 
Herd size 2001  -0.003  0.001  0.033  0.027  -0.001  0.006 
  [0.82]  [0.96] [0.13]  [0.24] [0.93]  [0.47] 
Milk yields 2001  0  0  0  0  0  0 
  [0.38]  [0.39] [0.53]  [0.48] [0.72]  [0.51] 
Labour endowments 2001  0.043  0.037  0.043  0.05  -0.006  -0.014 
  [0.18]  [0.33] [0.29]  [0.19] [0.84]  [0.68] 
Off-farm job 2001  0.087  0.096  0.158  0.144  0.017  0.03 
  [0.41]  [0.41] [0.14]  [0.16] [0.65]  [0.49] 
Unearned income 2001  -0.075  -0.096  -0.092  -0.066  -0.053  -0.087 
  [0.24]  [0.17] [0.43]  [0.60] [0.44]  [0.26] 
Delays in payments 2001  -0.079  -0.071  -0.302*  -0.310*  0.332***  0.346*** 
  [0.46] [0.47]  [0.057]  [0.069] [0.0086]  [0.0073] 
Podlaskie  0.019  0.026 -0.063  -0.075 0.141  0.156 
  [0.89]  [0.85] [0.75]  [0.72] [0.22]  [0.23] 
Constant  0.149  0.213 -0.098  -0.158 0.239  0.313 
  [0.46]  [0.29] [0.74]  [0.55] [0.27]  [0.20] 
           
Observations  185  185 185  185 185  185 
R-squared  0.22  0.224 0.232  0.227 0.237  0.19 
p-values in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 PANEL DATA ESTIMATIONS 
As regards the panel analysis, two remarks should be made. First, it uses information 
for only two years (2001 and 2006). Second, it bases on the sample containing 185 
observations. Overall then, it uses relatively limited information. Therefore, the 
results obtained with this method should be treated with some caution. Nevertheless, 
it is assumed that, if not strikingly different from the previous findings, the panel 
specifications could serve as a valuable tool to prove the robustness of the methods 
used earlier. Similar remarks concern also propensity score matching analysis that 
follows afterwards.  
The main advantage of the FE specification is that it allows one to control for all 
unobservable factors which differ across households but are constant over time 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Employing RE model on the other hand, offers the possibility to 
additionally account for omitted variables that are constant between households but 
do vary over time. As a result, FE/RE models help to substantially reduce potential 
endogeneity-induced bias which is likely to affect logit results and, in the presence of 
weak instruments, IV results as well. Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variable a logit model for panel data is considered. Following Hausman test, a logit 
random-effects model was found to be more efficient than a logit fixed-effects model. 
In case of the Polish dairy sector using RE specification instead of FE model is highly 
justifiable for at least three reasons. First, it allows one to control for changes in the 
regional development. Second, it allows one to account for changes in policies 
implemented both at national and regional level. Last but not least, it allows one to 
control for the effect of Poland’s accession to the EU and thorough reorganisation of 
the local dairy sector following introduction of the milk quota system. Since there is 
no software available that would allow to run logit with weights, in addition to logit 
RE model, weighted linear fixed-effects model is employed.  
The dependent variable in the FE/RE models measures households’ access to bank 
loans in 2001 and 2006. As regards the independent variables, the main variable of 
interest (representing market channel choice) is a dummy distinguishing households 
supplying the modern channel (i.e. equalling zero for all observations in 2001 and 
equalling one in 2006 for those who changed the channel). The rest of the explanatory 
variables are defined as earlier and refer to 2001 and 2006. Compared to the baseline 
and IV analyses, some of them had to be removed due to lack of relevant information 
for both years or because they were constant over time.  The FE/RE results are reported in Table 3. When comparing them with the baseline 
and IV results, in most instances the estimated coefficients have the same sign and 
similar magnitude. The coefficient on the main variable of interest, i.e. the one 
representing market channel choice, in all three specifications is positive, thus being 
fully in line with the previous findings. In the former two models (columns 1 and 2) it 
is close to being statistically significant, whereas in the latter model (column 3) passes 
Table 3. Random and fixed-effects models measuring the impact of market channel choice on 
  farms’ access to credit  
Dependent variable:  









      
Marketing Channel  0.993  0.999  0.091* 
 [0.12]  [0.13]  [0.097] 
Age 0.02  0.023  0.016 
 [0.49]  [0.44]  [0.35] 
Assets typical to dairy  0.134  0.196  0.034** 
 [0.52]  [0.37]  [0.026] 
Machinery 0.072  -0.052  -0.003 
 [0.53]  [0.68]  [0.93] 
Herd size  0.101*  0.087  0.009 
 [0.055]  [0.010]  [0.37] 
Milk yields  -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.000* 
 [0.021]  [0.022]  [0.088] 
Land owned  -0.01  0.001  -0.001 
 [0.67]  [0.96]  [0.57] 
Land leased    0.072*  0.018 
   [0.054]  [0.20] 
Labour endowments  0.031  0.08  0.009 
 [0.89]  [0.73]  [0.80] 
Off-farm job  0.744  0.738  -0.027 
 [0.19]  [0.21]  [0.63] 
Unearned income  -0.455  -0.667  0.024 
 [0.39]  [0.24]  [0.79] 
Delays in payments    0.722  0.270** 
   [0.38]  [0.025] 
Constant -3.521*  -3.640*  -0.269 
 [0.063]  [0.066]  [0.48] 
      
Observations 370  370  370 
Number of id  185  185  185 
R-squared     0.258 
p-values in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
the relevant test at the 10% significance level. Although one cannot exclude that these 
results show that actual relationship between access to bank credit and farmers’ 
market channel choice is somewhat weaker than that indicated by the previous 
analyses, higher standard errors may be due to relatively scanty information used for 
the analysis. Leaving this issue aside, it seems that the obtained results are fairly 
robust irrespective of whether one uses logit, IV or panel data models.  
 
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING METHODS  
As by the panel data techniques, the focus by the propensity score matching methods 
(PSM) is to employ methods that would allow to rule out the impact of unobservable 
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modern marketing channel may be easily confounded with that of the factors 
determining the decision to enter this channel. The main characteristics of PSM 
approach are outlined below.  
Since one does not observe what would have happened if the modern-channel farmer 
had remained in the traditional channel (or the converse), an estimate of the 
counterfactual is constructed. Basing on number of observable characteristics the 
probability of supplying the modern marketing channel is calculated for each 
surveyed farmer. After that an index – the propensity score – for each individual is 
created. The next step involves matching between the modern- and traditional-channel 
farmers which have the same, or very close, propensity score. Thanks to that 
comparisons are made between farmers who, although belonging to two different 
groups, are as similar as possible.  
As mentioned earlier, the propensity score matching methods are based on observable 
characteristics. Therefore, the result of matching is highly dependent on the quality of 
the latter (Becker and Ichino, 2002). For the purposes of the present analysis a wide 
range of variables is used to estimate propensity scores. These include variables 
representing farm’s human, social and physical capital; features characterising dairy 
production (both quality and quantity); characteristics of dairy processors as well as 
regional specificities. Full list of variables used to estimate propensity score and their 
definitions are presented in Annex. Important to note is the fact that all matching 
covariates, except for variables measuring education and regional characteristics, refer 
to the year 2001. This was done in order to avoid the problem of endogeneity when 
estimating the propensity score.  
Several matching methods are used in the analysis. First, ‘the nearest neighbour with 
replacement’ estimator is employed. In this setting, farmers from the two compared 
groups with closest propensity scores are matched. Since ideal matching might be 
impossible and the sample is relatively small it is allowed that farm from one group 
can be a best match for more than one farm from the other group. In addition, calliper 
equal to 0.01 is employed. The rationale for using calliper is to decrease the likelihood 
of obtaining inexact matching (Cochran and Rubin, 1973). Because the nearest 
neighbour match is exposed to the problem of existence of outliers in the dataset the 
analysis uses also more robust Epanechnikov kernel estimator. Finally, as a 
robustness check, Gaussian kernel and local linear regression estimators are employed 
  14 1 1(Fan, 1992; Heckman et al., 1997; 1998). All matching methods did fairly well in 
terms of removing significant differences between the two groups of farmers being 
compared (see Table 4).  
Table 4. Goodness of matching 
  Covariates distribution did not overlap sufficiently: 
covariate significant after matching, p<0.05 
Nearest neighbour – calliper 0.01  None 
Kernel Epanechnikov  None 
Kernel Gaussian  Labour endowments 
Local linear regression  Labour endowments 
 
The results indicating the differences between the matched households in terms of 
their access to credit and propensity to switch are reported in Table 5. As previously, 
no significant difference between the modern- and traditional-channel farmers was 
found in terms of their willingness to switch between processors. Overall then, these 
findings do not provide support for the 'loyalty' hypothesis. In addition, PSM methods 
generally are not in opposition with results from earlier methods as regards the impact 
of market channel choice on farm’s access to credit.  
Table 5. Differences between the modern- and the traditional-channel farmers – propensity score 
  matching analysis  










SWITCH  +/- +/- +/-  +/- 
NOT WILLING 
TO SWITCH  +/- -* +/-  +/- 
ACCESS TO 
CREDIT  +/-  +/- +/-  +** 
“+” describes phenomenon more common among the modern channel farmers, whereas “-” describes 
phenomenon more common among the traditional channel farmers; “+/-” means that there is no 
significant difference between the two groups; ** and * denote the difference between the two groups 
of farmers being significant at the 5% and 10% significance level respectively 
 
To summarise, the econometric analysis provided robust evidence that the modern-
channel farmers are not more willing to shift to other purchasers than the traditional-
channel farmers. Moreover, it has been shown that entering the modern-channel 
positively affects farmers’ odds on getting the bank loan. These findings are not 
consistent with the 'loyalty' and the 'insufficient capital hypotheses' that predicted 
vertical coordination between processing industry and the modern-channel farmers to 
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This paper aimed to analyse the vertically-linked nature of the dairy food chain in 
Poland. It has been observed, that dairy companies undertake various activities to 
assist farmers in adjusting to requirements of the restructured food marketing system. 
Interestingly, support is provided not only by processors sourcing from the traditional 
marketing channel, but also by dairies relying solely on the modern-channel suppliers. 
Basing on the current literature, two hypotheses are formulated that could potentially 
account for this phenomenon. The 'loyalty hypothesis' assumes that vertical 
coordination is used by processors to prevent their already modernised suppliers from 
shifting to other purchasers. The 'insufficient capital hypothesis' on the other hand, 
states that vertical linkages are mainly due to farmers' insufficient access to financial 
capital. From this perspective then, processing industry uses various assistance 
programmes to assure the optimal level and high quality of supplies. To test these 
hypotheses logit model, instrumental variables, panel data techniques and propensity 
score matching methods are employed. All of them produced consistent results, which 
indicate that the modern-channel farmers do not differ from their traditional-channel 
counterparts in terms of willingness to shift to other purchasers. Therefore, providing 
them with assistance cannot be explained on the grounds of the 'loyalty hypothesis'. 
Moreover, joining the modern channel improves farmers' access to bank loan. This 
suggests that the modern-channel farmers are not left to processors' resources, but 
have other opportunities to raise the necessary funds. This finding is not consistent 
with the 'insufficient capital' hypothesis. Overall then, explanations provided in the 
current literature are at most partial with regard to the situation considered here.  
The obtained results suggest, therefore, that there must be some other factors 
determining assistance provided by the modern-channel processors and that should 
become of interest for future research. Exploring the issue of bargaining power of the 
downstream and upstream sectors in the context of the supply chain reorganisation 
could be one of the potential departure points. Further understanding of the 
investigated phenomenon could be gained if analyses were made for other countries.  
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variables measuring education and regional characteristics) 
Personal characteristics 
Age of head of the household 
Gender of head of the household 
Experience in managing farm (years) 
Level of education of head of the household  
Is it agricultural education 
Maximum education reached by the rest of the family 
 
Household characteristics 
Index of assets typical to dairy production (yes/no) 
Index of machinery having general application (no. of items) 
Land owned (ha) 
Land leased (ha) 
Labour endowments (weighted sum of people over 15 years old) 
Access to off-farm job (yes=1, no=0) 
Access to unearned income (yes=1, no=0) 
Access to credit (yes=1, no=0) 
 
Dairy production 
Herd size (no. of cows) 
Milk yields per cow (litres/year) 
Had milk refused due to poor quality (yes=1, no=0) 
Experienced problems with timely payments (yes=1, no=0) 
Distance to the closest processor (km) 
Distance to the closest collection point (km) 
 
Regional characteristics 
Majority of neighbouring households quitted milk production in 2001-2006 (yes=1, no=0) 
Few of neighbouring households quitted milk production in 2001-2006 (yes=1, no=0) 
Podlaskie – household located in Podlaskie region (yes=1, no=0) 
 
 